A sequence of recent works have constructed constant-size quasi-adaptive (QA) NIZK arguments of membership in linear subspaces ofĜ m , whereĜ is a group equipped with a bilinear map e :Ĝ ×Ȟ → T. Although applicable to any bilinear group, these techniques are less useful in the asymmetric case. For example, Jutla and Roy (Crypto 2014) show how to do QA aggregation of Groth-Sahai proofs, but the types of equations which can be aggregated are more restricted in the asymmetric setting. Furthermore, there are natural statements which cannot be expressed as membership in linear subspaces, for example the satisfiability of quadratic equations. In this paper we develop specific techniques for asymmetric groups. We introduce a new computational assumption, under which we can recover all the aggregation results of Groth-Sahai proofs known in the symmetric setting. We adapt the arguments of membership in linear spaces ofĜ m to linear subspaces ofĜ m ×Ȟ n . In particular, we give a constant-size argument that two sets of Groth-Sahai commitments, defined over different groupsĜ,Ȟ, open to the same scalars in Zq, a useful tool to prove satisfiability of quadratic equations in Zq. We then use one of the arguments for subspaces inĜ m ×Ȟ n and develop new techniques to give constant-size QA-NIZK proofs that a commitment opens to a bit-string. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first constant-size proofs for quadratic equations in Zq under standard and falsifiable assumptions. As a result, we obtain improved threshold Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product equations, ring signatures, proofs of membership in a list, and various types of signature schemes.
Introduction
Ideally, a NIZK proof system should be both expressive and efficient, meaning that it should allow to prove statements which are general enough to be useful in practice using a small amount of resources. Furthermore, it should be constructed under mild security assumptions. As it is usually the case for most cryptographic primitives, there is a trade off between these three design goals. For instance, there exist constant-size proofs for any language in NP (e.g. [15] ) but based on very strong and controversial assumptions, namely knowledge-of-exponent type of assumptions (which are non-falsifiable, according to Naor's classification [31] ) or the random oracle model. The Groth-Sahai proof system (GS proofs) [19] is an outstanding example of how these three goals (expressivity, efficiency, and mild assumptions) can be combined successfully. It provides a proof system for satisfiability of quadratic equations over bilinear groups. This language suffices to capture almost all of the statements which appear in practice when designing public-key cryptographic schemes over bilinear groups. Although GS proofs are quite efficient, proving satisfiability of m equations in n variables requires sending some commitments of size Θ(n) and some proofs of size Θ(m) and they easily get expensive unless the statement is very simple. For this reason, several recent works have focused on further improving proof efficiency (e.g. [10, 11, 32] ) Among those, a recent line of work [22, 23, 25, 27] has succeeded in constructing constant-size arguments for very specific statements, namely, for membership in subspaces ofĜ m , whereĜ is some group equipped with a bilinear map where the discrete logarithm is hard. The soundness of the schemes is based on standard, falsifiable assumptions and the proof size is independent of both m and the witness size. These improvements are in a quasi-adaptive model (QA-NIZK, [22] ). This means that the common reference string of these proof systems is specialized to the linear space where one wants to prove membership.
Interestingly, Jutla and Roy [23] also showed that their techniques to construct constant-size NIZK in linear spaces can be used to aggregate the GS proofs of m equations in n variables, that is, the total proof size can be reduced to Θ(n). Aggregation is also quasi-adaptive, which means that the common reference string depends on the set of equations one wants to aggregate. Further, it is only possible if the equations meet some restrictions. The first one is that only linear equations can be aggregated. The second one is that, in asymmetric bilinear groups, the equations must be one-sided linear, i.e. linear equations which have variables in only one of the Z q modulesĜ,Ȟ, or Z q . 3 Thus, it is worth to investigate if we can develop new techniques to aggregate other types of equations, for example, quadratic equations in Z q and also recover all the aggregation results of [23] (in particular, for two-sided linear equations) in asymmetric bilinear groups. The latter (Type III bilinear groups, according to the classification of [14] ) are the most attractive from the perspective of a performance and security trade off, specially since the recent attacks on discrete logarithms in finite fields by Joux [21] and subsequent improvements. Considerable research effort (e.g. [2, 13] ) has been put into translating pairing-based cryptosystems from a setting with more structure in which design is simpler (e.g. composite-order or symmetric bilinear groups) to a more efficient setting (e.g. prime order or asymmetric bilinear groups). In this line, we aim not only at obtaining new results in the asymmetric setting but also to translate known results and develop new tools specifically designed for it which might be of independent interest.
Our Results
In Sect. 3, we give constructions of constant-size QA-NIZK arguments of membership in linear spaces ofĜ m ×Ȟ n . Denote the elements ofĜ (respectively ofȞ) with a hat (resp. with an inverted hat), asx ∈Ĝ (respectively, asy ∈Ȟ). GivenM ∈Ĝ m×t andŇ ∈Ȟ n×t , we construct QA-NIZK arguments of membership in the language LM ,Ň := {(x,y) ∈Ĝ m ×Ȟ n : ∃w ∈ Z t q ,x =Mw,y :=Ňw}, which is the subspace ofĜ m ×Ȟ n spanned by M N . This construction is based on the recent constructions of [25] . When m = n, we construct QA-NIZK arguments of membership in LM ,Ň,+ := {(x,y) ∈Ĝ m ×Ȟ m : ∃w ∈ Z t q , x + y = (M + N)w}, which is the linear subspace ofĜ m ×Ȟ m of vectors (x,y) such that the sum of their discrete logarithms is in the image of M + N (the sum of discrete logarithms ofM andŇ). From the argument for LM ,Ň , we easily derive another constant-size QA-NIZK argument in the space L com,Û,V,ν := (ĉ,ď) ∈Ĝ m ×Ȟ n : ∃(w, r, s),ĉ =Û w r ,ď =V w s ,
whereÛ ∈Ĝ m×m ,V ∈Ȟ n×ñ and w ∈ Z ν q . Membership in this space captures the fact that two commitments (or sets of commitments) inĜ,Ȟ open to the same vector w ∈ Z ν q . This is significant for the efficiency of quadratic GS proofs in asymmetric groups since, because of the way the proofs are constructed, one can only prove satisfiability of equations of degree one in each variable. Therefore, to prove a quadratic statement one needs to add auxiliary variables with commitments in the other group. For instance, to prove thatĉ opens to b ∈ {0, 1}, one proves that some commitmentď opens to b such that {b(b − 1) = 0, b − b = 0}. Our result allows us to aggregate the n proofs of the second statement.
To construct these arguments we introduce a new assumption, the Split Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SKerMDH). This assumption is derived from the recently introduced Kernel Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption (KerMDH, [30] ), which says that it is hard to find a vector in the co-kernel ofÂ ∈Ĝ ×k when A is such that it is hard to decide membership in Im(Â) (i.e. when A is an instance of a Matrix DH Assumption [11] ). Our SKerMDH Assumption says that one cannot find a solution to the KerMDH problem which is "split" between the groupsĜ andȞ. We think this assumption can be useful in other protocols in asymmetric bilinear groups. A particular case of Kernel MDH Assumption is the Simultaneous Double Pairing Assumption (SDP, [3] ), which is a well established assumption in symmetric bilinear maps, and its "split" variant is the SSDP Assumption (see Sect. 2.1).
In Sect. 4 we use the SKerMDH Assumption to lift the known aggregation results in symmetric groups to asymmetric ones. More specifically, we show how to extend the results of [23] to aggregate proofs of two-sided linear equations in asymmetric groups. While the original aggregation results of [23] were based on decisional assumptions, our proof shows that they are implied by computational assumptions.
Next, in Sect. 5, we address the problem of aggregating the proof of quadratic equations in Z q . For concreteness, we study the problem of proving that a commitment inĜ opens to a bit-string of length n. Such a construction was unknown even in symmetric bilinear groups (yet, it can be easily generalized to this setting, see Appendix C). More specifically, we prove membership in LÛ ,bits := {ĉ ∈Ĝ n+m :ĉ :
where (Û 1 ,Û 2 ) ∈Ĝ (n+m)×n ×Ĝ (n+m)×m are matrices which define a perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment to b. Specifically, we give instantiations for m = 1 (whenĉ is a single commitment to b), and m = n (whenĉ is the concatenation of n Groth-Sahai commitments to a bit). We stress that although our proof is constant-size, we need the commitment to be perfectly binding, thus the size of the commitment is linear in n. The common reference string which we need for this construction is quadratic in the size of the bit-string. Our proof is compatible with proving linear statements about the bit-string, for instance, that i∈[n] b i = t by adding a linear number (in n) of elements to the CRS (see Sect. 5.5). We observe that in the special case where t = 1 the common reference string can be linear in n. The costs of our constructions and the cost of GS proofs are summarized in Table 1 .
We stress that our results rely solely on falsifiable assumptions. More specifically, in the asymmetric case we need some assumptions which are weaker than the Symmetric External DH Assumption plus the SSDP Assumption. Interestingly, our construction in the symmetric setting relies on assumptions which are all weaker than the 2-Lin Assumption (see Appendix C).
We think that our techniques for constructing QA-NIZK arguments for bit-strings might be of independent interest. In the asymmetric case, we combine our QA-NIZK argument for LM ,Ň,+ with decisional assumptions inĜ andȞ. We do this with the purpose of using QA-NIZK arguments even when M + N has full rank. In this case, strictly speaking "proving membership in the space" looses all meaning, as every vector inĜ m ×Ȟ m is in the space. However, using decisional assumptions, we can argue that the generating matrix of the space is indistinguishable from a lower rank matrix which spans a subspace in which it is meaningful to prove membership.
Finally, in Sect. 6 we discuss some applications of our results. In particular, our results provide shorter signature size of several schemes, more efficient ring signatures, more efficient proofs of membership in a list, and improved threshold GS proofs for pairing product equations.
Comms
Proof CK CRS(ρ) #Pairings , between GS proofs and our different constructions. Our NIZK construction for bit-strings is denoted by Π bit and the construction for proving that two sets of commitments open to the same value Ψ D k ,com . Row "Π bit m = 1" is for our construction for a single commitment of size n + 1 to a bit-string of size n. Rows "Π bit m = n (i)" and "Π bit m = n (ii)" are for our construction for n concatenated GS commitments, using the two different CRS distributions described in Sect. 5.5. Rows "Π bit weight 1, m = 1" and "Π bit weight 1, m = n" are for our constructions for bit-strings of weight 1 with m = 1 and m = n, respectively. Column "Comms" contains the size of the commitments, "CK" the size of the commitment keys in the CRS, and "CRS(ρ)" the size of the language dependent part of the CRS. The size of elements inĜ andȞ is g and h, respectively. The table is computed for D k = L2, the 2-Linear matrix distribution.
Preliminaries
Let Gen a be some probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which on input 1 λ , where λ is the security parameter, returns the description of an asymmetric bilinear group (q,Ĝ,Ȟ, T, e,ĝ,ȟ), whereĜ,Ȟ and T are groups of prime order q, the elementsĝ,ȟ are generators ofĜ,Ȟ respectively, and e :Ĝ ×Ȟ → T is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate bilinear map.
We denote by g and h the bit-size of the elements ofĜ andȞ, respectively. Elementsx ∈Ĝ (resp. y ∈Ȟ, z T ∈ T) are written with a hat (resp, with inverted hat, sub-index T) and0,0 and 0 T denote the neutral elements. Givenx ∈Ĝ,y ∈Ȟ,xy refers to the pairing operation, i.e.xy = e(x,y). Vectors and matrices are denoted in boldface and any product of vectors/matrices of elements in G andȞ is defined in the natural way via the pairing operation. That is, givenX ∈Ĝ n×m anď Y ∈Ȟ m× ,XY ∈ T n× . The productXŶ ∈ T n× is defined similarly by switching the arguments of the pairing. Given a matrix T = (t i,j ) ∈ Z m×n q ,T (resp.Ť) is the natural embedding of T in G (resp. inȞ), that is, the matrix whose (i, j)th entry is t i,jĝ (resp. t i,jȟ ). Conversely, givenT oř T, we use T ∈ Z n×m q for the matrix of discrete logarithms ofT (resp.Ť). We denote by I n×n the identity matrix in Z n×n q and e n i the ith element of the canonical basis of Z n q (simply e i if n is clear from the context). We make extensive use of the set [n + k] × [n + k] \ {(i, i) : i ∈ [n]} and for brevity we denote it by I n,k .
Computational Assumptions
Definition 1. Let , k ∈ N with > k. We call D ,k a matrix distribution if it outputs (in poly time, with overwhelming probability) matrices in Z ×k q . We define D k := D k+1,k and D k the distribution of the first k rows when A ← D k .
Definition 2 (Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption [11] ). Let D ,k be a matrix distribution and Γ := (q,Ĝ,Ȟ, T, e,ĝ,ȟ) ← Gen a (1 λ ). We say that the D ,k -Matrix Diffie-Hellman (D ,k -MDDHĜ) Assumption holds relative to Gen a if for all PPT adversaries D,
where the probability is taken over Γ ← Gen a (1 λ ), A ← D ,k , w ← Z k q ,û ←Ĝ and the coin tosses of adversary D.
The D ,k -MDDHȞ problem is defined similarly. In this paper we will refer to the following matrix distributions:
The L k -MDDH Assumption is the k-linear family of Decisional Assumptions [20, 33] . The L 1 -MDDH X , X ∈ {Ĝ,Ȟ}, is the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption in X, and the assumption that it holds in both groups is the Symmetric External DH Assumption (SXDH). The L ,k -MDDH Assumption is used in our construction to commit to multiple elements simultaneously. It can be shown tightly equivalent to the L k -MDDH Assumption. The U ,k Assumption is the Uniform Assumption and is weaker than the L k -MDDH. Additionally, we will be using the following family of computational assumptions: Definition 3 (Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption [30] ). Let Γ ← Gen a (1 λ ). The Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption inȞ (D ,k -KerMDHȞ) says that every PPT Algorithm has negligible advantage in the following game: givenǍ, where A ← D ,k , findx ∈Ĝ \{0}, such thatx Ǎ = 0 T . The Simultaneous Pairing Assumption inȞ (SPȞ) is the U 1 -KerMDHȞ Assumption and the Simultaneous Double Pairing Assumption (SDPȞ) is the L 2,3 -KerMDHȞ Assumption. The Kernel Diffie-Hellman assumption is a generalization and abstraction of these two assumptions to other matrix distributions. The D ,k -KerMDHȞ Assumption is weaker than the D ,k -MDDHȞ Assumption, since a solution allows to decide membership in Im(Ǎ).
For our construction, we need to introduce a new family of computational assumptions.
Definition 4 (Split Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Let Γ ←Gen a (1 λ ). The Split Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption inĜ,Ȟ (D ,k -SKerMDH) says that every PPT Algorithm has negligible advantage in the following game: given (Â,Ǎ), A ← D ,k , find a pair of vectors (r,š) ∈Ĝ ×Ȟ , r = s, such thatr Ǎ =š Â .
As a particular case we consider the Split Simultaneous Double Pairing Assumption inĜ,Ȟ (SSDP) which is the L 2 -SKerMDH Assumption. Intuitively, the Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption says one cannot find a non-zero vector inĜ which is in the co-kernel ofǍ, while the new assumption says one cannot find a pair of vectors inĜ ×Ȟ such that the difference of the vector of their discrete logarithms is in the co-kernel ofǍ. The name "split" comes from the idea that the output of a successful adversary would break the Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption, but this instance is "split" between the groupsĜ andȞ. When k = 1, the D ,k -SKerMDH Assumption does not hold.
The assumption is generically as least as hard as the standard,"non-split" assumption in symmetric bilinear groups. This means, in particular, that in Type III bilinear groups, one can use the SSDP Assumption with the same security guarantees as the SDP Assumption, which is a well established assumption (used for instance in [29] ). Suppose there is a generic algorithm which breaks the D ,k -SKerMDH Assumption. Intuitively, given two different encodings of A ← D ,k , (Â,Ǎ), this algorithm findsr andš, r = s such that r Ǎ =š Â . But since the algorithm is generic, it also works whenĜ =Ȟ, and thenr −ŝ is a solution to D ,k -KerMDH. For a formal proof, see Appendix F.
Groth-Sahai NIZK Proofs
The GS proof system allows to prove satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations in a bilinear group. The admissible equation types must be in the following form:
where A 1 , A 2 , A T are Z q -vector spaces equipped with some bilinear map f :
, t ∈ A T . The modules and the map f can be defined in different ways as: (a) in pairing-product equations (PPEs), We briefly recall some facts about GS proofs in the SXDH instantiation used in the rest of the paper. Let Γ ← Gen a (1 λ ), u 2 , v 2 ← L 1 , u 1 := e 1 + µu 2 , v 1 := e 1 + v 2 , µ, ← Z q . The common reference string is crs GS := (Γ,û 1 ,û 2 ,v 1 ,v 2 ) and is known as the perfectly sound CRS. There is also a perfectly witness-indistinguishable CRS, with the only difference being that u 1 := µu 2 and v 1 := v 2 and the simulation trapdoor is (µ, ). These two CRS distributions are computationally indistinguishable. Implicitly, crs GS defines the maps:
The maps ι X , X ∈ {1, 2} can be naturally extended to vectors of arbitrary length δ ∈ A m X and we write ι X (δ) for (ι X (δ 1 )|| . . . ||ι X (δ m )).
The perfectly sound CRS defines perfectly binding commitments for any variable in A 1 or A 2 . Specifically, the commitment to x ∈ A 1 isĉ := ι 1 (x) + r 1 (û 1 −ê 1 ) + r 2û2 ∈Ĝ 2 , and to y ∈
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments
We recall the definition of Quasi Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) Arguments of Jutla et al. [22] . A QA-NIZK proof system enables to prove membership in a language defined by a relation R ρ , which in turn is completely determined by some parameter ρ sampled from a distribution D Γ . We say that D Γ is witness samplable if there exist an efficient algorithm that samples (ρ, ω) such that ρ is distributed according to D Γ , and membership of ρ in the parameter language L par can be efficiently verified with ω. While the Common Reference String can be set based on ρ, the zero-knowledge simulator is required to be a single probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that works for the whole collection of relations R Γ .
A tuple of algorithms (K 0 , K 1 , P, V) is called a QA-NIZK proof system for witness-relations R Γ = {R ρ } ρ∈sup(D Γ ) with parameters sampled from a distribution D Γ over associated parameter language L par , if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator (S 1 , S 2 ), such that for all non-uniform PPT adversaries A 1 , A 2 , A 3 we have:
Quasi-Adaptive Completeness:
Computational Quasi-Adaptive Soundness:
Perfect Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge:
where -P(ψ, ·, ·) emulates the actual prover. It takes input (x, w) and outputs a proof π if (x, w) ∈ R ρ . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. -S(ψ, τ, ·, ·) is an oracle that takes input (x, w). It outputs a simulated proof
Note that ψ is the CRS in the above definitions. We assume that ψ contains an encoding of ρ, which is thus available to V. We will sometimes need that our arguments satisfy a stronger notion of soundness. This notion is only meaningful for witness samplable distributions and it requires soundness to hold even when the adversary receives a witness that ρ is in the parameter language.
Computational Quasi-Adaptive Strong Soundness:
≈ 0.
QA-NIZK Argument for Linear Spaces
In this section we recall the two constructions of QA-NIZK arguments of membership in linear spaces given by Kiltz and Wee [25] , for the language:
Algorithm K 0 (1 λ ) just outputs Γ := (q,Ĝ,Ȟ, T, e,ĝ,ȟ) ← Gen a (1 λ ), the rest of the algorithms are described in Fig. 1 . Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of [25] ). If D k = D k andk = k + 1, Fig. 1 describes a QA-NIZK proof system with perfect completeness, computational adaptive soundness based on the D k -KerMDHȞ Assumption, perfect zero-knowledge, and proof size k + 1.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 2 of [25] ). If D k = D k andk = k, and D Γ is a witness samplable distribution, Fig. 1 describes a QA-NIZK proof system with perfect completeness, computational adaptive soundness based on the D k -KerMDHȞ Assumption, perfect zero-knowledge, and proof size k.
New QA-NIZK Arguments in Asymmetric Groups
In this section we construct three QA-NIZK arguments of membership in different subspaces of G m ×Ȟ n . Their soundness relies on the Split Kernel Assumption. 
Argument of Membership in Subspace Concatenation
We refer to this as the Concatenation Language, because if we define P as the concatenation of M,Ň, that is P := M N , then (x,y) ∈ LM ,Ň iff x y is in the span of P. Soundness Intuition. If we ignore for a moment thatĜ,Ȟ are different groups,
Further, the information that an unbounded adversary can extract from the CRS about ∆ is:
Given that the matrix Z is uniformly random, crs Ψ D k and crs Ψ D k ,spl reveal the same information about ∆ to an unbounded adversary. Therefore, as the proof of soundness is essentially based on the fact that parts of ∆ are information theoretically hidden to the adversary, the original proof of [25] can be easily adapted for the new arguments. The proofs can be found in Appendix A. Fig. 2 describes a QA-NIZK proof system with perfect completeness, computational adaptive soundness based on the D k -SKerMDH Assumption, and perfect zero-knowledge.
Theorem 4. If D k = D k andk = k, and D Γ is a witness samplable distribution, Fig. 2 describes a QA-NIZK proof system with perfect completeness, computational adaptive strong soundness based on the D k -SKerMDH Assumption, and perfect zero-knowledge.
Argument of Sum in Subspace
We can adapt the previous construction to the Sum in Subspace Language,
We define two proof systems Ψ D k ,+ , Ψ D k ,+ as in Fig. 2 , but now with Λ = Ξ. Intuitively, soundness follows from the same argument because the information about Λ in the CRS is now Λ A, Λ(M + N).
Argument of Equal Opening in Different Groups
Given the results for Subspace Concatenation of Sect. 3.1, it is direct to construct constant-size NIZK Arguments of membership in:
. This language is interesting because it can express the fact that (ĉ,ď) are commitments to the same vector w ∈ Z ν q in different groups. The construction is an immediate consequence of the observation that L com,Û,V,ν can be rewritten as some concatenation language LM ,Ň . Denote byÛ 1 the first ν columns ofÛ andÛ 2 the remaining ones, andV 1 the first ν columns ofV andV 2 the remaining ones. If we define:
then it is immediate to verify that L com,Û,V,ν = LM ,Ň .
In the rest of the paper, we denote as Ψ D k ,com the proof system for L com,Û,V,ν which corresponds to Ψ D k ,spl for LM ,Ň , whereM,Ň are the matrices defined above. Note that for commitment schemes we can generally assumeÛ,V to be drawn from some witness samplable distribution. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 4 that Ψ D k ,com satisfies the notion of strong soundness.
Aggregating Groth-Sahai Proofs in Asymmetric Groups
In this section we discuss two different ways to aggregate GS equations. The first is a direct application of the proof of equal commitment opening and is only valid for two-sided linear equations in Z q , the second is an extension of the results of Jutla and Roy for all other types of linear equations.
Aggregating Two-Sided Linear Equations in Z q
We note that proving that n pairs of GS commitments open (pairwise) to the same elements in Z q is simply a special case of the proof of equal commmitment opening in Sect. 3.3. Indeed, the concatenation of n GS commitments is just a commitment to a vector of scalars. In particular, given crs GS = (Γ,û 1 ,û 2 ,v 1 ,v 2 ), it is easy to see that n commitments to x i ∈ Z q , which are of the form:
and similarly the concatenation of n commitmentsď i , i ∈ [ ] can be written asV 1 y +V 2 s, wherê V i is the blockwise concatenation of n copies ofv i . In particular, proving that n GS commitments open to the same value can be also seen as the aggregation of the proof of n GS equations of the form x − y = 0. The aggregation of any other set of two-sided linear equations in Z q easily reduces to this case using the homomorphic properties of GS commitments. Indeed, given n equations of the form:
and the commitments to a satisfying assignment (where the commitments to every coordinate of x (resp. y) are inĜ (resp.Ȟ), it is easy to derive a commitment to x β − t inĜ and a commitment to α y inȞ for all ∈ [n]. Obviously, the equations are satisfied if for each , these commitments open to the same value.
We insist that two-sided linear equations in Z q are essential to prove quadratic statements in asymmetric bilinear groups. In particular, this result can be used to reduce the proof size that n commitments open to a bit-string from 6n(g + h) to (4n + 2)(g + h).
QA Aggregation of Other Equation Types
Jutla and Roy [23] show how to aggregate GS proofs of two-sided linear equations in symmetric bilinear groups. In the original construction of [23] soundness is based on a decisional assumption (a weaker variant of the 2-Lin Assumption). Its natural generalization in asymmetric groups (where soundness is based on the SXDH Assumption) only enables to aggregate the proofs of one-sided linear equations.
In this section, we revisit their construction. We give an alternative, simpler, proof of soundness under a computational assumption which avoids altogether the "Switching Lemma" of [23] . Further, we extend it to two-sided equations in the asymmetric setting. For one-sided linear equations we can prove soundness under any kernel assumption and for two-sided linear equations, under any split kernel assumption. 4 Let A 1 , A 2 , A T be Z q -vector spaces compatible with some Groth-Sahai equation as detailed in Sect. 2.2. Let D Γ be a witness samplable distribution which outputs n pairs of vectors (α , β ) ∈
, for some m x , m y ∈ N. Given some fixed pairs (α , β ), we define, for each t ∈ A n T , the set of equations St as:
We note that, as in [23] , we only achieve quasi-adaptive aggregation, that is, the common reference string is specific to a particular set of equations. More specifically, it depends on the constants α , β (but not ont , which can be chosen by the prover) and it can be used to aggregate the proofs of St, for anyt.
Given the equation types for which we can construct NIZK GS proofs, there always exists (1)
, for other types of equations. For simplicity, in the construction we assume that (1) is the case, otherwise change ι 2 (a ,i ), ι 1 (t ) for ι 1 (a ,i ), ι 2 (t ) in the construction below.
Given a solution x = x, y = y to St, the prover proceeds as follows:
-Commit to all x j ∈ A 1 asĉ j ← Comm GS (x j ), and to all y j ∈ A 2 asď j ← Comm GS (y j ).
-For each i ∈ [k], run the GS prover for the equation
, run the GS verifier for equation
f (t , a ,i ).
Theorem 5. The above protocol is a QA-NIZK proof system for two-sided linear equations.
Proof. Completeness. Observe that
Completeness follows from the observation that to efficiently compute the proof, the GS Prover [19] only needs, apart from a satisfying assignment to the equation, the randomness used in the commitments plus a way to compute the inclusion map of all involved constants, in this case ι 1 (a ,i α ,j ), ι 2 (a ,i β ,j ) and the latter is part of the CRS. Soundness. We change to a game Game 1 where we know the discrete logarithm of the GS commitment key, as well as the discrete logarithms of (α , β ), ∈ [n]. This is possible because they are both chosen from a witness samplable distribution.
We now prove that an adversary against the soundness in Game 1 can be used to construct an adversary B against the D n,k -SKerMDH Assumption, where D n,k is the matrix distribution used in the CRS generation.
B receives a challenge (Â,Ǎ) ∈Ĝ n×k ×Ȟ n×k . Given all the discrete logarithms that B knows, it can compute a properly distributed CRS even without knowledge of the discrete logarithm ofÂ. The soundness adversary outputs commitments
, which are accepted by the verifier.
Let x (resp.x) be the vector of openings of {ĉ j } j∈[mx] in A 1 (resp. in the groupĜ) and y (resp.y) the vector of openings of {ď j } j∈[my] in A 2 (resp. in the groupȞ). If A 1 =Ĝ (resp. A 2 =Ȟ) then x =x (resp. y =y). The vectorsx andy are efficiently computable by B who knows the discrete logarithm of the commitment keys. We claim that the pair (ρ,σ) ∈Ĝ n ×Ȟ n , ρ := (β 1x −t 1 , . . . , β nx −t n ),σ := (α 1y , . . . , α ny ), solves the D n,k -SKerMDH challenge.
First, observe that if the adversary is successful in breaking the soundness property, then ρ = σ. Indeed, if this is the case there is some index ∈ [n] such that E (x, y) =t , which means that
. If we take discrete logarithms in each side of the equation, this inequality is exactly equivalent to ρ = σ.
Further, because GS proofs have perfect soundness, x and y satisfy the equation
which implies thatρǍ =σÂ. Zero-Knowledge. The same simulator of GS proofs can be used. Specifically the simulated proof corresponds to k simulated GS proofs.
One-Sided Equations. In the case when α = 0 andt = f (t , base 2 ) for some t ∈ A 1 , for all ∈ [n], proofs can be aggregated under a standard Kernel Assumption (and thus, in asymmetric bilinear groups we can choose k = 1). Indeed, in this case, in the soundness proof, the adversary B receivesǍ ∈Ȟ n×k , an instance of the D n,k − KerMDHȞ problem. The adversary B outputŝ ρ := (β 1x −t 1 , . . . , β nx −t n ) as a solution to the challenge. To see why this works, note that, when α = 0 for all ∈ [n], equation (3) reads ∈[n]ǎ ,i β x −t = 0 T and thusρǍ = 0 T . The case when β = 0 andt = f (base 1 , t ) for some t ∈ A 2 , for all ∈ [n], is analogous.
Public Parameters. The size of the CRS of the construction above depends on the number of elements needed to representÂ. In this sense, it is interesting to sampleÂ from some family of matrix assumptions with good representation size. As we assume that n > k, it is interesting to instantiate this scheme with the Circulant Matrix Distribution of [30] , which has a representation size of n -independent of k.
QA-NIZK Arguments for Bit-Strings
We construct a constant-size QA-NIZK for proving that a perfectly binding commitment opens to a bit-string. That is, we prove membership in the language:
whereÛ := (Û 1 ,Û 2 ) ∈Ĝ (n+m)×n ×Ĝ (n+m)×m defines perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment keys. The witness for membership is (b, w) andÛ ← D Γ , where D Γ is some witness samplable distribution.
To prove that a commitment inĜ opens to a vector of bits b, the usual strategy is to compute another commitmentď ∈Ȟn to a vectorb ∈ Z n q and prove (1) 
. For statement (2) , sinceÛ is witness samplable, we can use our most efficient QA-NIZK from Sect. 3.3 for equal opening in different groups. Under the SSDP Assumption, which is the SKerMDH Assumption of minimal size conjectured to hold in asymmetric groups, the proof is of size 2(g + h). Thus, the challenge is to aggregate n equations of the form b i (b i −1) = 0. We note that this is a particular case of the problem of aggregating proofs of quadratic equations, which was left open in [23] .
We finally remark that the proof must includeď and thus it may be not of size independent of n. However, it turns out thatď needs not be perfectly binding, in factn = 2 suffices.
Intuition
A prover wanting to show satisfiability of the equation x(y − 1) = 0 using GS proofs, will commit to a solution x = b and y = b asĉ = bû 1 + rû 2 andď = bv 1 + sv 2 , for r, s ← Z q , and then give a pair (θ,π) ∈Ĝ 2 ×Ȟ 2 which satisfies the following verification equation 5 :
The reason why this works is that, if we express both sides of the equation in the basis of T 2×2 given by
on the left side and 0 on the right side (regardless of (θ,π)). Our observation is that the verification equation can be abstracted as saying:
Now consider commitments to (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and (b 1 , . . . , b n ) constructed with some commitment key {(ĝ i ,ȟ i ) : i ∈ [n + 1]} ⊂Ĝ n ×Ȟ n , for some n ∈ N, to be determined later, and defined asĉ :
is the coordinate ofĝ iȟ i in the left side of the equation. Equation 6 suggests to use one of the constant-size QA-NIZK Arguments for linear spaces to get a constant-size proof that b i (b i − 1) = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Unfortunately, these arguments are only defined for membership in subspaces inĜ m orȞ m but not in T m . Our solution is to include information in the CRS to "bring back" this statement from T toĜ, i.e. the matricesĈ i,j :=ĝ i h j , for each (i, j) ∈ I n,1 . Then, to prove that b i (b i − 1) = 0 for all i ∈ [n], the prover computesΘ b(b−1) as a linear combination of C := {Ĉ i,j : (i, j) ∈ I n,1 } (with coefficients which depend on b, b, r, s)
and gives a QA-NIZK proof ofΘ b(b−1) ∈ Span(C).
This reasoning assumes that {ĝ i h j } (or equivalently, {Ĉ i,j }) are linearly independent, which can only happen if n ≥ n + 1. If that is the case, the proof cannot be constant becauseΘ b(b−1) ∈Ĝ n×n and this matrix is part of the proof. Instead, we chooseĝ 1 , . . . ,ĝ n+1 ∈Ĝ 2 andȟ 1 , . . . ,ȟ n+1 ∈Ȟ 2 , so that {Ĉ i,j } ⊆Ĝ 2×2 . Intuitively, this should still work because the prover receives these vectors as part of the CRS and he does not know their discrete logarithms, so to him, they behave as linearly independent vectors.
With this change, the statementΘ b(b−1) ∈ Span(C) seems no longer meaningful, as Span(C) is all ofĜ 2×2 with overwhelming probability. But this is not the case, because by means of decisional assumptions inĜ 2 and inȞ 2 , we switch to a game where the matricesĈ i,j span a non-trivial space ofĜ 2×2 . Specifically, to a game whereĈ i * ,i * / ∈ Span(C) and i * ← [n] remains hidden to the adversary. Once we are in such a game, perfect soundness is guaranteed for equation b i * (b i * − 1) = 0 and a cheating adversary is caught with probability at least 1/n. We think this technique might be of independent interest.
The last obstacle is that, using decisional assumptions on the set of vectors {ȟ j } j∈[n+1] is incompatible with using the discrete logarithms ofȟ j to compute the matricesĈ i,j :=ĝ i h j given in the CRS. To account for the fact that, in some games, we only know g i ∈ Z q and, in some others, only h j ∈ Z q , we replace each matrixĈ i,j by a pair (Ĉ i,j ,Ď i,j ) which is uniformly distributed conditioned on C i,j + D i,j = g i h j . This randomization completely hides the group in which we can compute g i h j . Finally, we use our QA-NIZK Argument for sum in a subspace (Sect. 3.2) to prove membership in this space.
Instantiations
We discuss in detail two particular cases of languages LÛ ,bits . First, in Sect. 5.3 we discuss the case when (a)ĉ is a vector inĜ n+1 ,û n+1 ← L n+1,1 andÛ 1 :
In this case, the vectorsĝ i in the intuition are defined asĝ
, and the commitment to b is computed asĉ := i∈[n] b iûi + wû n+1 . Then in Sect. 5.5 we discuss how to generalize the construction for a) to (b)ĉ is the concatenation of n GS commitments. That is, given the GS CRS crs GS = (Γ,û 1 ,û 2 ,v 1 ,v 2 ), we define,Û
Although the proof size is constant, in both of our instantiations the commitment size is Θ(n). Specifically, (n + 1)g for case a) and 2ng for case b).
The Scheme
Let a ← L 1 and defineǎ ∆ := ∆ ǎ ∈Ȟ n+1 . For any pair (i, j) ∈ I n,1 , let T i,j ← Z 2×2 q and set:
Note thatĈ i,j can be efficiently computed as h j ∈ Z 2 q is the vector of discrete logarithms ofȟ j . Let Ψ D k ,+ be the proof system for Sum in Subspace (Sect. 3.2) and Ψ D k ,com be an instance of our proof system for Equal Opening (Sect. 3.3). Let crs Ψ D k ,+ ← K 1 (Γ, {Ĉ i,j ,Ď i,j } (i,j)∈I n,1 ) and 6 crs Ψ D k ,com ← K 1 (Γ,Ĝ,Ȟ, n). The common reference string is given by:
and then: 1. Defineĉ
) and (ĉ ∆ ,ď) using crs Ψ D k ,+ and crs Ψ D k ,com respectively. If any of these checks fails, the verifier outputs 0, else it outputs 1. S 1 (Γ,Û): The simulator receives as input a description of an asymmetric bilinear group Γ and a matrixÛ ∈Ĝ (n+1)×(n+1) sampled according to distribution D Γ . It generates and outputs the CRS in the same way as K 1 , but additionally it also outputs the simulation trapdoor
where τ Ψ D k ,+ and τ Ψ D k ,com are, respectively, Ψ D k ,+ 's and Ψ D k ,com 's simulation trapdoors.
Proof of Security
Completeness is proven in Appendix B.1. The following theorem guarantees Soundness. Theorem 6. Let Adv PS (A) be the advantage of an adversary A against the soundness of the proof system described above. There exist PPT adversaries B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , P * 1 , P * 2 such that
The proof follows from the indistinguishability of the following games:
Real This is the real soundness game. The output is 1 if the adversary breaks the soundness, i.e. the adversary submits someĉ =Û b wg , for some b / ∈ {0, 1} n and w ∈ Z q , and the corresponding proof which is accepted by the verifier. Game 0 This game is identical to Real except that algorithm K 1 does not receiveÛ as a input but it samples (Û, U) ∈ R par itself according to D Γ . Game 1 This game is identical to Game 0 except that the simulator picks a random i * ∈ [n], and uses U to check if the output of the adversary A is such that b i * ∈ {0, 1}. It aborts if b i * ∈ {0, 1}. Game 2 This game is identical to Game 1 except that now the vectorsĝ i , i ∈ [n] and i = i * , are uniform vectors in the space spanned byĝ n+1 .
Game 3 This game is identical to Game 2 except that now the vectorȟ i * is a uniform vector inȞ 2 , sampled independently ofȟ n+1 .
It is obvious that the first two games are indistinguishable. The rest of the argument goes as follows (the remaining proofs are in Appendix B.2). 
,ĝ i * ←Ĝ 2 , and defineŝ G := (ÊW 0 ||ĝ i * ||ÊW 1 ||ŝ). In the real algorithm K 1 , the generator picks the matrix ∆ ∈ Z 2×(n+1) q . Although B does not know ∆, it can compute∆ as∆ =ĜU −1 , given that U is full rank and was sampled by B, so it can compute the rest of the elements of the common reference string using the discrete logarithms ofÛ,Ȟ andǎ.
In caset is uniform overĜ 2 , by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma det(Ê) = 0 with probability at most 2/q. Thus, with probability at least 1 − 2/q, the matrixÊ is full-rank andĜ is uniform over G 2×(n+1) as in Game 1 . On the other hand, in caset = γŝ, all ofĝ i , i = i * , are in the space spanned byĝ n+1 as in Game 2 . Proof. Pr[det((g i * ||g n+1 )) = 0] = Pr[det((h i * ||h n+1 )) = 0] ≤ 2/q, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma. Then, with probability at least 1 − 4/q, g i * h i * is linearly independent from {g i h j :
} is a basis ofȞ 2 , we can define w h , b i * as the unique coefficients in Z q such thatď = b i * ȟ i * + w hȟn+1 . We distinguish three cases: 1) Ifĉ ∆ = ∆ĉ, we can construct an adversary B against the SPȞ Assumption that outputsĉ ∆ − ∆ĉ ∈ ker(ǎ ).
2) Ifĉ
whenever b i * =b i * , an adversary P * 2 against the strong soundness of Ψ D k ,com outputs the pair (ρ b−b ,σ b−b ) which is a fake proof for (ĉ ∆ ,ď). Note that strong soundness is required since, in order to compute {Ĉ i,j ,Ď i,j : (i, j) ∈ I n,1 }, P * 2 requires the discrete logs of eitherĜ orĎ.
3) Ifĉ
This concludes the proof of soundness. Now we prove Zero-Knowledge.
Theorem 7. The proof system is perfect quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge.
Proof. First, note that the vectorď ∈Ȟ 2 output by the prover and the vector output by S 2 follow exactly the same distribution. This is because the rank ofȞ is 1. In particular, although the simulator S 2 does not know the opening ofĉ, which is some
) is uniformly distributed conditioned on satisfying check 2) of algorithm V. Therefore, these elements of the simulated proof have the same distribution as in a real proof. This fact combined with the perfect zero-knowledge property of Ψ D k ,+ and Ψ D k ,com concludes the proof.
Extensions
CRS Generation for Individual Commitments. A natural way to extend our construction to individual commitments (distribution (b) from Sect. 5.2) is the following. The only change is that the matrix ∆ is sampled uniformly from Z 2×2n q (the distribution ofȞ is not changed). Thus, the matrixĜ := ∆Û has 2n columns instead of n + 1 andĉ ∆ :=Ĝ b wg for some w g ∈ Z n q . In the soundness proof, the only change is that in Game 2 , the extra columns are also changed to span a one-dimensional space, i.e. in this gameĝ i , i ∈ [2n − 1] and i = i * , are uniform vectors in the space spanned byĝ 2n . With this approach, the proof size is still constant and the changes to the original construction are minimal but the CRS is considerably larger. Further, we do not know how to make the CRS linear for bit-strings of weight 1.
Therefore, we propose an alternative way to extend our result to individual commitments. In this new construction, the matrixĜ is independent fromÛ and for all i ∈ [n],ĝ i = µ iĝn+1 , µ i ← Z q andĝ n+1 ← Z 2 q . The proof is defined in a slightly different way. Now one computesĉ ∆ :=Ĝ b w g , w g ← Z q , and one proves that the three commitments,ĉ,ĉ ∆ ,ď open to the same value. Intuitively, this replaces in the original construction the proofs that ∆ĉ =ĉ ∆ and that ∆ĉ andď open to the same value. More specifically, this is proven by showing that ( ĉ c ∆ ,ď) ∈ LM ,Ň , where.
The advantage of this alternative approach is that the matrixĜ has now n + 1 columns as in the original construction as opposed to 2n in the first extension to individual commitments. 7 The proof system ΨD k ,+ is constructed for matrices {(Ci,j, Di,j) : (i, j) ∈ In,1} sampled from some distribution DΓ , which in this case depends on the distribution of G and H. We assume that the adversary P * 2 against ΨD k ,+ receives the common reference string of ΨD k ,+ as described in Section 3.2 and additionally the matricesĜ andȞ which defines the language, i.e. the distribution of Ci,j, Di,j (this is necessary so that P * 2 can simulate the crs for adversary A). We stress this additional information to describe the language does not affect the soundness proof for Theorem 3 (in particular,Ĝ andȞ are independent of (Λ, Ξ)).
The proof of soundness must be modified in the following way. In the proof of Lemma 3 one setsĝ n+1 :=ŝ andĝ i * :=t, similarly as done in Lemma 4. This guarantees that, as in the original construction, in the last gameĝ i * (resp.ȟ i * ) is linearly independent of the rest of columns ofĜ (resp.Ȟ). In the last game we need to show thatĉ ∆ = b i * ĝ i * +w gĝn+1 andď = b i * ȟ i * +w hȟn+1 , for somew g ,w h ∈ Z q and that b i * ∈ {0, 1}. Note that the fact that ( ĉ c ∆ ,ď) ∈ LM ,Ň implies that
= M N γ, and the fact thatĉ is perfectly binding together with the form ofM,Ň implies that
To conclude the proof of soundness we just need to argue that b i * = {0, 1}, leads to a contradiction. This follows from the same argument as the original proof.
For zero-knowledge, observe thatĉ ∆ is just a uniform vector in Span(ĝ n+1 ). The simulator just picks a randomĉ ∆ and simulates the proof that ( ĉ c ∆ ,ď) ∈ LM ,Ň with the appropriate trapdoor. The rest of the proof is identical to the simulated proof in the original construction.
Linear Equations Satisfied by Bit-Strings
Because of the homomorphic properties of the commitments, we can easily extend it to prove that the bit-string b satisfies i∈[n] β i b i = t, for some β ∈ Z n q , t ∈ Z q . If the commitmentĉ is a concatenation of GS commitments to b i , this can be done in the usual way with GS proofs. But ifÛ is drawn from distribution (a) (see Sect. 5.2) this can also be done as follows.
and letê i denote the i th vector of the canonical basis ofĜ . We claim the following:
This is justified because Bu i = Be n+1 i = (1, 0) , and then Bĉ−tê 2 1 = wBû n+1 + i∈[n] b i Bû i −tê 2 1 . So to be able to prove that i∈[n] β i b i = t, we just need to add to the CRS the necessary elements to prove membership in L Bû n+1 := {x ∈Ĝ 2 : ∃w ∈ Z q ,x = Bû n+1 w} using one of the constructions of Sect. 2.4.
Bit-Strings of Weight 1
In the special case when the bit-string has only one 1 (this case is useful in some applications, see Sect. 6), the size of the CRS can be made linear in n, instead of quadratic. To prove this statement we would combine our proof system for bit-strings of section 5.3 and a proof that i∈[n] b i = 1 as described above when m = 1 or using GS-proofs when m = n. In the definition of (Θ b(b−1) ,Π b(b−1) ) in Eq. 8, one sees that for all pairs (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n], the coefficient
. If i * is the only index such that b i * = 1, then we have:
Therefore, one can replace in the CRS the pairs of matrices (Ĉ i,j ,Ď i,j ) by (Ĉ i, = ,Ď i, = ), i ∈ [n]. The resulting CRS is linear in n.
Applications
Many protocols use proofs that a commitment opens to a bit-string as a building block. Since our commitments are still of size Θ(n), our results may not apply to some of these protocols (e.g. range proofs). Yet, there are several applications where bits need to be used independently and our results provide significant improvements. Table 2 summarizes them.
Signatures
Some application examples are the signature schemes of [4, 5, 8, 12] . For example, in the revocable attribute-based signature scheme of Escala et. al [12] , every signature includes a proof that a set of GS commitments, whose size is the number of attributes, opens to a bit-string. Further, the proof of membership in a list which is discussed below can also be used to reduce the size of Ring Signature scheme of [9] , which is the most efficient ring signature in the standard model. To sign a message m, among other things, the signer picks a one-time signature key and certifies the one-time verification key by signing it with a Boneh-Boyen signature under vk α . Then, the signer commits to vk α and shows that vk α belongs to the list of Boneh-Boyen verification keys (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ) of the parties in the ring R.
Proof System
Author Proof Size Threshold GS Ràfols [32] (1) (mx + 3(n − t) + 2n)g Ràfols [32] (2) 2(n − t + 1)h + 2n(g + h) This work 2(n + 1)g + 10(g + h) Table 2 . Comparison of the application of our techniques and results from the literature. In rows labeled as "Threshold GS" we give the size of the proof of satisfiability of t-out-of-n sets Si, where mx is the sum of the number of variables inĜ in each set Si, andn is the total number of two-sided and quadratic equations in some i∈[n] Si. For all rows, we must add to the proof size the cost of a GS proof of each equation in one of the sets Si. In the other rows n is the size of the list.
Threshold GS Proofs for PPEs
There are two approaches to construct threshold GS proofs for PPEs, i.e. proofs of satisfiability of t-out-of-n equations. One is due to [16] and consists of compiling the n equations into a single equation which is satisfied only if t of the original equations are satisfied. For the case of PPEs, this method adds new variables and proves that each of them opens to a bit. Our result reduces the cost of this approach, but we omit any further discussion as it is quite inefficient because the number of additional variables is Θ(m var + n), where m var is the total number of variables in the original n equations. The second approach is due to Ràfols [32] . The basic idea behind [32] , which extends [17] , follows from the observation that for each GS equation type tp, the CRS space K is partitioned into a perfectly sound CRS space K b tp and a perfectly witness indistinguishable CRS space K h tp .
In particular, to prove satisfiability of t-out-of-n sets of equations from {S i : i ∈ [n]} of type tp, it suffices to construct an algorithm K corr which on input crs GS and some set of indexes A ⊂ [n], |A| = t, generates n GS common reference strings {crs i , i ∈ [n]} and simulation trapdoors τ i,sim , i ∈ A c , in a such a way that 8 : a) it can be publicly verified the set of perfectly sound keys, {crs i :
tp } is of size at least t, b) there exists a simulator S corr who outputs (crs i , τ i,sim ) for all i ∈ [n], and the distribution of {crs i : i ∈ [n]} is the same as the one of the keys output by K corr when crs GS is the perfectly witness-indistinguishable CRS.
The prover of t-out-of-n satisfiability can run K corr and, for all i ∈ [n], compute a real (resp. simulated) proof for S i with respect to crs i when i ∈ A (resp. when i ∈ A c ). Ràfols gives two constructions for PPEs, the first one can be found in [32] , App. C and the other follows from [32, Sect. 7] 9 . Our algorithm K corr for PPEs 10 goes as follows:
The simulator just defines b = 0. The reason why this works is that when b i = 1, (ẑ i −û 1 ) ∈ Span(û 2 ), therefore crs i ∈ K b P P E and when b i = 0, (ẑ i −û 1 ) / ∈ Span(û 2 ) so crs i ∈ K h P P E .
More Efficient Proof of Membership in a List
Chandran et al. construct a ring signature of size Θ( √ n) [9] , which is the most efficient ring signature in the standard model. Their construction uses as a subroutine a non-interactive proof of membership in some list L = (l 1 , . . . ,l n ) which is of size Θ( √ n). The trick of Chandran et al. to achieve this asymptotic complexity is to view L as a matrixL ∈Ĝ m×m , for m = √ n, where the i, j th element ofL isl i,j :=l (i,j) and (i, j) := (i − 1)m + j. Given a commitmentĉ to some element l α , where α = (i α , j α ), their construction in asymmetric bilinear groups works as follows :
We note that although in step 4 the equations are all two-sided linear equations, proofs can only be aggregated if the list comes from a witness samplable distribution and the CRS is set to depend on that specific list. This is not useful for the application to ring signatures, since the CRS should be independent of the ring R (which defines the list). If aggregation is possible then the size of the proof in step 4 is reduced from (2g + 4h) √ n to 4g + 8h. A complete description of the proof can be found in Appendix D, where we also show that when the CRS depends on the list and the list is witness samplable, the proof can be further reduced to Θ( 3 √ n).
A Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4
Theorem 8 (Theorem 3 repeated). If D k = D k andk = k + 1, Fig. 2 describes a QA-NIZK proof system with perfect completeness, computational adaptive soundness based on the D k -SKerMDH Assumption, and perfect zero-knowledge.
Proof. (Soundness.) B receives a challenge (Â,Ǎ), A ← D k , and then it chooses Λ ← Z 
Since Z is a uniform random value, the CRS reveals (information theoretically) only ∆ M N , ∆ A about ∆. But since a) (x * ,y * ) / ∈ LM ,Ň , w is not in the image of M N and b) A has more rows than columns, it follows by a standard argument that ∆w is undetermined from the adversary's point of view. 
So far the argument is very similar to [25] Sect. 3.2, now comes an important difference. Adversary B also needs to compute ΛM +Ẑ and ΞŇ −Ž. Although the adversary B does not know how to compute ΞN or ΛM, it can compute their sum in Z q as:
Thus, B picks Z ← Z k×t q and outputsŇ Ξ :=Ť −Ž andM Ξ :=Ẑ. Now, when F outputs a valid proof for some (x,y) / ∈ LM ,Ň , it holds that:x
while, by assumption, (x,y) / ∈ LM ,Ň and thusx E = −y F, so c − d = 0. We conclude with an information-theoretic argument: because R is only revealed to B through RA the probability that
This proves standard soundness. Strong soundness follows from the fact that the argument is essentially information theoretic. In particular, the knowledge of (M, N) does not reveal additional information about R.
B Additional details for QA-NIZK for Bit-Strings

B.1 Completeness
It is obvious by definition that for anyĉ ∈ LÛ ,bits the vectorĉ ∆ generated by an honest prover passes the verification test described in 1).
Note that, by definition ofĈ i,j andĎ i,j ,Ĉ i,jǏ2×2 +Î 2×2Ďi,j =ĝ iȟj .
Finally, the rest of the proof follows from completeness of Ψ D k ,com and Ψ D k ,+ . Proof. The probability that Game 1 (A) = 1 is the probability that a) Game 0 (A) = 1 and b) b i * / ∈ {0, 1}. The view of adversary A is independent of i * , while, if Game 0 (A) = 1, then there is at least one index ∈ [n] such that such that b / ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the probability that the event described in b) occurs conditioned on Game 0 (A) = 1, is greater than or equal to 1/n and the lemma follows. Proof. The adversary B receives an instance of the U 1 -MDDHȞ problem, which is a pair (š,ť), whereš is a uniform vector ofȞ 2 andť is either a uniform vector inȞ 2 orť = γš, for random γ ∈ Z q .
B.2 Soundness Proof
Adversary B definesȟ n+1 :=š and the rest of the columns ofȞ are honestly sampled with the sole exception ofȟ i * , which is set toť.
Given that adversary B can only compute g iȟ j ∈Ȟ 2×2 , it definesĎ i,j := g iȟ j −Ť i,j and C i,j :=T i,j , for T i,j ← Z 2×2 q and (i, j) ∈ I n,1 . Note that this does not change the distribution of (Ď i,j ,Ĉ i,j ), which is the uniform one conditioned on
The rest of the parameters are computed using a ← L 1 , the matrix ∆ ∈ Z 2×(n+1) q and the discrete logarithms ofĜ. It is immediate to see that adversary B perfectly simulates Game 2 wheň t = γš and Game 3 whenť is uniform.
B.3 Efficiency
If we take D k = L 2 , the proof is of size of 2(g + h) forĉ ∆ ,d, 4(g + h) for (Θ b(b−1) ,Π b(b−1) ), and
The whole proof size is 10(g + h).
The CRS is of size 4(g + h) for each pair (Ĉ i,j ,Ď i,j ), so it adds up to 4(g + h)((n + 1) 2 − n). To represent the matrixÛ we need n + 1 elements ofĜ, 2(n + 1) elements ofĜ forĜ and 2(n + 1) elements ofȞ forȞ. The size of crs Ψ D k ,+ is 2(g+h)((n+1) 2 −n)+12(g+h) and the size of crs Ψ D k ,com is 2(g + h)(n + 2) + 8(g + h). To representǎ andǎ ∆ we need n + 2 elements ofȞ In total, the CRS requires 6n 2 + 11n + 33 elements ofĜ and 6n 2 + 11n + 34 elements ofȞ.
The verifier computes n + 3 pairings in the first step of the verification algorithm, 12 pairings in the second step, and 24 + 16 pairings in the third step. The whole verification algorithm requires n + 55 pairing computations.
C QA-NIZK Arguments for Bit-Strings in Symmetric Bilinear Groups
C.1 Symmetric Bilinear Groups
Throughout this section, (q,Ĝ, T, e,ĝ) ← Gen s (1 λ ) is a description of a symmetric bilinear group, whereĜ, T are groups of prime order q, the elementĝ is a generator ofĜ, and e :Ĝ ×Ĝ → T is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate bilinear map.
We retake the definition and the examples of Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumptions given in section 2, except that we drop the sub-indexesĜ,Ȟ as hereĜ =Ȟ. As a computational assumption, we will use the Kernel Assumption in symmetric bilinear groups.
Definition 5 (Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption [30] ). Let Γ ←Gen s (1 λ ). The Kernel Diffie-Hellman Assumption inĜ (D ,k -KerMDH) says that every PPT Algorithm has negligible advantage in the following game: givenÂ, A ← D ,k , find a vectorr ∈Ȟ , r = 0, such thatr Ǎ = 0 T .
A well-known instance of it is the Simultaneous Double Pairing (SDP) Assumption, which is the L 3,2 -KerMDH Assumption, using the notation defined in Sect. 2.1. Recall that:
C.2 Intuition
In the symmetric case, a GS Proof that a commitment opens to a bit consists of a proof that the committed value b is such that b(b − 1) = 0. That is, compared to the asymmetric case, one does not need to commit to another value b and prove that b(b − 1) = 0 and b − b = 0, which would be less efficient in terms of proof size. It is natural to ask if we can do the same when we extend our construction to the symmetric setting, that is, if we can use the same key to commit to both groups, setĉ =d (now,Ĝ =Ȟ) and only give a proof that b i (b i − 1) = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Unfortunately, this approach completely fails, as we use in several places in a crucial way thatĝ i andĥ i are sampled independently. For instance, this is essential to be able to use decisional assumptions in the image ofĜ, or in the image ofĤ. Therefore, the construction in the symmetric case follows the same lines as in the asymmetric one. However, the construction is still a bit simpler in the symmetric case as there is no need to "split" g i h j as the matrices C i,j , D i,j . Recall that, following the intuition given in Sect. 5.1, this was done to allow any simulator knowing one and only one ofĝ i andȟ j discrete logarithms to create a properly distributed CRS. In the symmetric case, this happens "for free", asĝ i h j can be computed also as g iĥ j . As a consequence, we do not need to use our proof system from Sect. 3.2 and we can avoid the use of the Split Kernel Assumption.
In the construction below the matrixÛ is such that its last two columns are sampled from L n+2,2 and the matrix B is sampled from L 3,2 , but they can easily be replaced by other matrix assumptions. However, with this choice, if D k is also weaker than the 2-Lin Assumption, then security is based on assumptions which are all weaker than the 2-Lin Assumption. The construction can also be extended to the case whereĉ is the concatenation of several GS commitments. We omit any further details, as the extension is very similar as in the asymmetric case. 
C.3 QA-NIZK Arguments For Bit-Strings
, defineĜ := ∆Û and defineĝ i := ∆û i ∈ G 3 , for all i ∈ [n + 2]. For any pair (i, j) ∈ I n,2 , define:
where h j is the vector of discrete logarithms ofĥ j . Let Ψ D k be an instance of a QA-NIZK proof system for proving membership in linear subspaces ofĜ 9 (in symmetric groups), and let crs 9) . Let Ψ D k ,com be an instance of our QA-NIZK proof system from Sect. 3.3 adapted to the symmetric case and pick crs Ψ D k ,com ← K 1 (Γ,Ĝ,Ĥ, n).
Let B ← L 3,2 and define B ∆ := ∆ B ∈Ĝ (n+2)×2 . The common reference string is given by
P(crs P ,ĉ, (b, w g )): Pick w h ← Z 2 q and then: 1. Defineĉ [2] b i w h,jĈi,n+j + i∈ [2] j∈ [2] w g,i w h,jĈn+i,n+j , 
If any of these checks fails, the verifier outputs 0, else it outputs 1.
Completeness. It is obvious by definition that any tuple (ĉ,ĉ ∆ ) generated as described passes the verification test described in 1). On the other hand, given that b i (b i − 1) = 0 for each i ∈ [n]: [2] b i w h,jĝiĥ j + i∈ [2] j∈ [2] w g,i w h,jĝn+iĥ n+j [2] b i w h,jĈi,n+jÎ3×3 + i∈ [2] j∈ [2] w g,i w h,jĈn+i,n+jÎ3×3 .
Finally, the rest of the proof of completeness follows from completeness of Ψ D k and Ψ D k ,com .
Soundness. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let Adv PS (A) be the advantage of an adversary A against the soundness of the proof system described above. There exist PPT adversaries
Real This is the real soundness game. The output is 1 if the adversary breaks the soundness, i.e. the adversary submits someĉ =Û b wg , for some b / ∈ {0, 1} n and w ∈ Z 2 q , and the corresponding proof which is accepted by the verifier. Game 0 This game is identical to game Real except that algorithm K 1 does not receiveÛ as a input but it samples (Û, U) ∈ R par itself according to D Γ . Game 1 This game is identical to Game 0 except that the simulator picks a random i * ∈ [n], and uses U to check if the output of the adversary A is such that b i * ∈ {0, 1}. It aborts if b i * ∈ {0, 1}. Game 2 This game is identical to Game 1 except that now the vectorsĝ i , i ∈ [n] and i = i * , are uniform vectors in the space spanned byĝ n+1 ,ĝ n+2 . Game 3 This game is identical to Game 2 except that now the vectorĥ i * is a uniform vector inĜ 3 , sampled independently ofĥ n+1 ,ĥ n+2 .
It is obvious that the first two games are indistinguishable. The rest of the argument goes as follows. Proof. The probability that Game 1 (A) = 1 is the probability that a) Game 0 (A) = 1 and b) b i * / ∈ {0, 1}. The view of adversary A is independent of i * , while, if Game 0 (A) = 1, then there is at least one index such that b / ∈ {0, 1}. The probability that the event described in b) occurs conditioned on Game 0 (A) = 1, is greater than or equal to 1/n and the lemma follows. Proof. The adversary B receives an instance of the U 2 -MDDH problem, i.e. (Â,t), whereÂ is a uniform matrix inĜ 3×2 andt is either a uniform vectort inĜ 3 ort =Âγ, for γ ← Z 2 q . The simulator B defines all the parameters honestly, except that the U 2 -MDDH challenge is embedded in the matrixĜ.
LetD := (Â||t). Adversary
,ĝ i * ←Ĝ 3 , and definesĜ := (DW 0 ||ĝ i * ||DW 1 ||Â).
In the real algorithm K 1 , the generator picks the matrix ∆ ∈ Z 3×(n+2) q
. Although B but does not know ∆, it can compute∆ =ĜU −1 , given that U is full rank and B sampled (Û, U) itself. It is easy to see that it can generate the rest of the elements of the common reference string usinĝ ∆, the discrete logarithms ofÛ,Ĥ andB.
In caset is uniform overĜ 3 , by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma det(D) = 0 with probability at most 3/q. Thus, with probability at least 1 − 3/q,D is a full rank matrix andĜ is uniform over G 3×(n+2) as in Game 1 . On the other hand, in caset =Âγ, {ĝ n+1 ,ĝ n+2 } is a basis for Span(D) and eachĝ i , i ∈ [n], i = i * , is in the space spanned byĝ n+1 ,ĝ n+2 as in Game 2 . Proof. The adversary B receives an instance of the U 2 -MDDH problem, i.e. (Â,t), whereÂ is a uniform matrix ofĜ 3×2 andt is either a uniform vectort inĜ 3 ort =Âγ, γ ← Z 2 q . The simulator B defines (ĥ n+1 ||ĥ n+2 ) :=Â and the rest of the columns ofĤ are honestly sampled with the sole exception ofĥ i * , which is set tot. The rest of the parameters are computed by using B ← L 3,2 , the matrix ∆ ∈ Z 3×(n+2) q , and the matrix of discrete logarithms ofÛ. It follows directly that adversary B perfectly simulates Game 2 whent =Âγ and Game 3 when t is uniform the output of B. Lemma 11. There exists a SDP adversary B, and soundness adversaries P * 1 , P * 2 for Ψ D k and Ψ D k ,com , respectively, such that Pr [Game 3 (A) = 1] ≤ 6/q+Adv SDP (B)+Adv Ψ D k (P * 1 )+Adv Ψ D k ,com (P * 2 ).
Proof. Let E be the event that {g i * , g n+1 , g n+2 } is a basis ofĜ 3 and {ĥ i * ,ĥ n+1 ,ĥ n+2 } is a basis ofĜ 3 (when parameters are generated as in We next show that Pr [Game
, which concludes the proof.
Indeed, when E occurs, g i * ĥ i * is linearly independent from {g iĥ j : (i, j) ∈ [n + 2] 2 \ {(i * , i * )}}. Additionally Game 3 (A) = 1 implies that b i * / ∈ {0, 1}, while the verifier accepts the proof produced by A. Further, in this game, {ĥ i * ,ĥ n+1 ,ĥ n+2 } is a basis ofĜ 3 , so we can define w v ∈ Z 2 q , b i * ∈ Z q as the unique coefficients such thatd = b i * ĥ i * + w h,1ĥn+1 + w h,2ĥn+2 . We distinguish three cases: 1) Ifĉ ∆ = ∆ĉ, we can construct an adversary B against the SDP Assumption. The SDP challenge is the matrixB included in the common reference string. The adversary computes ∆ĉ and outputsĉ ∆ − ∆ĉ. This solves the SDP problem since bothĉ ∆ and ∆ĉ pass the check 1) of the verification algorithm, so (∆ĉ −ĉ ∆ ) B = (0 T 0 T ).
2) Ifĉ ∆ = ∆ĉ but b i * = b i * , this means that (ĉ ∆ ,d) is not in the space associated to crs Ψ D k ,com . This
Thus, we can construct an adversary P * 2 against the soundness of Ψ D k ,com which outputsσ as a fake proof for (ĉ ∆ ,d).
3) Ifĉ ∆ = ∆ĉ, and b i * = b i * , then b i * (b i * − 1) = 0 (otherwise this would contradict the fact that b * i / ∈ {0, 1}). But in this case we can construct an adversary P * 1 against the soundness of
given that the coordinate of
This concludes the proof of soundness, we now prove zero-knowledge.
Zero-Knowledge.
-S 1 (Γ,Û): The simulator receives as input a description of a symmetric bilinear group Γ and a matrixÛ ∈Ĝ (n+2)×(n+2) sampled according to distribution D Γ . It generates and outputs the common reference in the same way as K 1 , but additionally it also outputs the simulation trapdoor
-S 2 (crs P ,ĉ, τ ): Computeĉ ∆ := ∆ĉ. Then pick random (w h,1 , w h,2 ) and define
Then set:
Lemma 12. The proof system is perfect quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge.
Proof. First, note that the vectord ∈Ĝ 3 output by the prover and the vector output by S 2 follow exactly the same distribution. This is because the rank ofĤ is 2. In particular, although the
On the other hand, it is obvious by construction thatΠ b(b−1) is uniquely determined byĉ,d and the rest of the argument follows from the perfect zero-knowledge property of Ψ D k and Ψ D k ,com .
C.4 Efficiency
When D k = L 2 , our proofs consist of 6 group elements forĉ ∆ andd, 9 group elements forΠ b(b−1) , and 4 group elements forσ b(b−1) andσ b−b . The whole proof consist of 19 elements ofĜ.
The CRS consists of 9 group elements for eachĈ i,j , which sums up to a total of 9((n + 2) 2 − n). To representÛ we need 2(n + 1) group elements, 3(n + 2) elements for matrixĜ, 3(n + 2) elements forĤ, 2((n + 2) 2 − n) + 33 elements for crs Ψ D k , 2n + 36 elements for crs Ψ D k ,com 
D Complete Description of Applications
D.1 More Efficient Proof of Membership in a List of Vectors
For our proof of membership in a (witness samplable, static) list of size Θ( 3 √ n) which we describe next, we use as a building block our improvement of the proof of membership in a list of Chandran et al. extended to vectors, i.e. to the case where L = (l 1 , . . . ,l n ) is a list of vectors of length . In such a proof, we show that some commitmentĉ opens to a vectorl α , where α = (i α , j α ) (recall that (i, j) = √ n(i − 1) + j).
from the original CRS. In a simulated proof, commit to b i = 0, b j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [m]. In step 2, simply compute a real proof. In step 3, use the GS simulation algorithm (with trapdoor ) to simulate the proof. In Step 4, setx j =0. Finally, in step 6, simulate a proof using . It is not hard to see that such a proof can be simulated even without knowledge of an opening ofĉ.
in a Witness Samplable and Static List
We give a proof of membership in a list with improved asymptotic proof size when the list is drawn from a witness samplable distribution and the CRS depends on the list. The main idea is to combine the previous proof of membership in a list with a Split Kernel Assumption. Specifically, the CRS includes a matrixǍ, A ← D m,2 , whose rows are denotedǎ 1 , . . . ,ǎ m and a list
. As before, the goal to prove is that a commitmentĉ opens to somel α ∈ L = (l 1 , . . . ,l n ) and (i α , j α , k α ) are such that α = (i α , j α , k α ).
E.1 One-Time LHSPS Signatures in Different Groups
The one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Libert, Peters and Yung [27] implies a QA-NIZK Argument for linear spaces. Similarly, our constructions of QA-NIZK proofs for membership in concatenated subspace and for sum in subspace (in the case where the space is not from a witness samplable distribution) also have an equivalent one-time structure preserving signature scheme with different security properties.
In particular, for subspace concatenation, "one-time" means that the adversary is unable to sign vectors which are not in the span of previously signed vectors, namely, the adversary cannot output a signature for a pair (x * ,y * ) ∈Ĝ m ×Ȟ n if ((x * ) ||(y * ) ) is linearly independent from the vectors (x i ||y i ), i ∈ [q s ], (the concatenation of two vectors), where (x i ,y i ) are the signing queries of the adversary. The discussion for the scheme which results from our Sum-in-Subspace QA-NIZK proof, results in a different notion of "one-time" -this is captured in the security definition by a different predicate P -, see discussion below.
In either case, the size of the resulting signatures is (k + 1)(g + h) under the SKerMDH Assumption, but if security against random message attacks is sufficient (meaning that the signatures in the set Q which are seen by the adversary are sampled uniformly at random), the signature size can be reduced to k(g + h) (essentially, in this case one can sample A from D k ). This is inspired by the one-time constructions of structure-preserving signatures of [24] secure against random message attacks. We omit any further discussion of this case, as it is a straightforward generalization of our QA-NIZK proofs in the witness samplable setting using the ideas of [24] .
Our construction is based on the SKerMDH Assumption introduced in section 2. Following the syntactic definition of section E, our scheme assumes G =Ĝ m ×Ȟ n and the length of the messages is n + m.
-SignGen(1 λ , m, n): Let (q,Ĝ,Ȟ, T, e,ĝ,ȟ) ← Gen a (1 λ ). Choose A ← D k , Λ, Ξ ← Z (k+1)×m q , A Λ := Λ A, A Ξ := Ξ A The secret key is sk = (Λ, Ξ), while the public key is defined to be pk = (Â,Â Ξ ,Ǎ,Ǎ Λ ) ∈Ĝ (k+1)×k ×Ĝ m×k ×Ȟ (k+1)×k ×Ȟ m×k .
-Sign(sk, (x,y)): To sign a vector (x,y) ∈Ĝ m ×Ȟ m , pick z ← Z (k+1) q and output the pair (ρ,σ) ∈Ĝ (k+1) ×Ȟ (k+1) , defined as: ρ := Λx +ẑ,σ := Ξy −ž.
-SignDerive(pk, {(ω i ,ρ i ,σ i )} i=1 ): given the public key pk, and tuples (ω i ,ρ i ,σ i ), output the pair ( i=1 ω iρi , i=1 ω iσi ) ∈Ĝ (k+1) ×Ȟ (k+1) . -Verify(pk, (x,y), (ρ,σ)) is a deterministic algorithm, that takes as input a public key pk, a signature (ρ,σ) and returns 1 if and only if (ρ,σ) satisfieŝ ρ Ǎ +σ Â =x Ǎ Λ +y Â Ξ .
Correctness. If a signature is correctly generated then
Therefore the verification algorithm outputs 1 on a correctly generated signature. The proof of correctness of the signature derivation algorithm follows a similar argument. Let Q = {(x i ,y i )} i∈[qs] be some set of elements ofĜ m ×Ȟ n . We define the predicate P as P ((x,y), Q) = 1 iff (x ||y ) ∈ Z 2m q is not in the space spanned by {(x i ||y i ) : i ∈ [q s ]}.
Theorem 13. The signature scheme is Type P unforgeable if the SKerMDH Assumption holds in G,Ȟ.
The argument is almost identical to [26] .
Proof. We show how to construct an algorithm B which takes as input an instance (Â,Ǎ) of the SKerMDH Assumption and outputs a pair of vectors (r,š) ∈Ĝ 3 ×Ȟ 3 , r = s, such thatr Ǎ =š Â given oracle access to a forger F against the signature scheme (see Sect. E).
Algorithm B starts by honestly running the key generation algorithm using a randomly chosen sk = (Λ, Ξ). Any signature query of F on a vector (x,y) is honestly answered by B, by running the signing algorithm. The game ends with F outputting a vector (x * ,y * ) with a valid signature (ρ * ,σ * ). At this point, B computes its own signature (ρ † ,σ † ) using the secret key sk := (Λ, Ξ). The adversary B will output as a response to the SKerMDH challenge the pair (ρ * −ρ † ,σ † −σ * ).
We now see that, with overwhelming probability, this is a valid answer to the SKerMDH challenge. Indeed, since both signatures satisfy the verification equation, we can subtract the verification equation of each pair, obtaining:
(ρ * −ρ † ) Ǎ = (σ † −σ * ) Â Therefore, all we need to argue is that ρ * − ρ † = σ † − σ * with overwhelming probability. This is equivalent to show that the probability that ρ * + σ * = ρ † + σ † is negligible. The key point of the argument is that ρ † + σ † = Λx * + Ξy * = Λ Ξ
x * y * is information theoretically hidden to F. The rest of the argument is identical to [26] . The argument goes as follows: since, by assumption, x * y * is independent of all previous queries, then there is some information about Λ Ξ which is information theoretically hidden. Thus, ρ † + σ † is information theoretically hidden and from the adversary's point of view it is equally likely that it has any out of q potential values.
Each element in the list L A is a tuple (P i , s i , x i ), where P i ∈ Z q [A 11 , . . . , A k ], x i ∈ {1, 2, T } and s i = ξ x i (P i (a 11 , . . . , a k )). The polynomial P i is one of the following: a) P i = A ij , i.e. it is one of the initial values in the query list L A or b) a constant polynomial or c) P i = P c + P d for some (P c , s c , x), (P d , s d , x) ∈ L A or d) P i = P c P d for some (P c , s c , 1), (P d , s d , 2) ∈ L A , x i = T . For L B the same holds except that x i ∈ {1, T } and except that d) is changed to: d) P i = P c P d for some (P c , s c , 1), (P d , s d , 1) ∈ L B and x i = T .
Without loss of generality we can identify the queries of A with pairs (P i , x i ) meeting the restrictions described above. If (P i , x i ) was queried before, it replies with the same answer s i .
Else, when B receives a (valid) query (P i , x i ), if x i ∈ {1, T } it simply forwards the query to its own group oracle, who replies with s i . Then (P i , s i , x i ) is appended to L B and to L A . If x i = 2, then it forwards the query to its own group oracle as (P i , 1). When it receives the answer s i , B appends (P i , s i , 1) to L B and it looks for the set S of all tuples (P j , s j , 1) ∈ L B , P j = P i , such that s j = s i . For every tuple in S, B checks if there is somes such that (P j ,s, 2) is in L A (note that, because of the way L A is constructed, if suchs exists it is the same for all P j ).
If suchs exists, it appends (P i ,s, 2) in L A and it replies withs. Else it chooses somes uniformly at random conditioned on being distinct from all other values s such that there exist some P such that (P, s, 2) is in L A . Finally, it appends (P i ,s, 2) in L A .
Finally, A will output as a solution to the challenge a pair s q , s r such that (Q, s q , 1), (R, s r , 2) ∈ L A . Because of the way L A and L B were constructed, there exists some s r such that (Q, s q , 1), (R, s r , 1) ∈ L A . B queries its group oracle for (R − Q, 1) and obtains as a reply some string s R−Q . Finally, it outputs s R−Q as a solution to its challenge. It easily follows that A and B have exactly the same probability of success.
Finally, we note that the L 2 -SKerMDH Assumption is implied by a decisional assumption introduced in [28] . The assumption says that, given (Â,Ǎ), where A ← L 2 , the vector (Âw,Ǎw), w ← Z 2 q , is computationally indistinguishable from (û,ǔ), u ← Z 3 q . The proof is analogous to the proof that D ,k -MDDH ⇒ D ,k -KerMDH. Suppose that (r,š) is a solution to the L 2 -SKerMDH Assumption, thenr Ǎ w −š Â w = (r Ǎ −š Â )w = 0 T , whiler ǔ −š û = 0 T only with negligible probability whenever r = s.
